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A Fool for a Client: Competency Standards in  
Pro Se Cases 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“[A] lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client.”1 
While the old adage may be true, it fails to address the situation 
where the person invoking the right to self-representation lacks 
competency. Unfortunately, courts have not elucidated standards to 
decide whether a pro se defendant is competent to represent himself. 
Instead, the Supreme Court recognized competency as a limitation 
on the right of self-representation without giving guidance to courts 
on how to implement the new limitation. 
The Sixth Amendment protects criminal defendants by ensuring 
that the accused “shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed of the 
nature and cause of accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in 
his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”2 
Indeed, “[t]he Sixth Amendment includes a compact statement of 
the rights necessary to a full defense.”3 Further, the Supreme Court 
found that the rights embodied in the Sixth Amendment imply a 
right for a criminal defendant to personally “make his defense,” 
which includes the right of self-representation.4 
Not only does the Constitution protect defendants at trial, but 
the Constitution also protects defendants before trial by prohibiting 
states from subjecting individuals to a trial if they lack capacity to use 
their Sixth Amendment rights.5 Thus, if a judge suspects a defendant  
 
 
 1. Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 438 (1991). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 3. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975). 
 4. Id. at 819–20 (“Although not stated in the Amendment in so many words, the right 
to self-representation—to make one’s own defense personally—is thus necessarily implied by 
the structure of the Amendment. The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is 
he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails.”). 
 5. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (“It has long been accepted that a 
person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and 
object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his 
defense may not be subjected to a trial.”). 
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lacks the capacity to proceed at trial, the judge should suspend the 
trial until the defendant fully gains the ability to use his Sixth 
Amendment rights.6 If a judge does determine a defendant is not 
competent to stand trial, a judge may commit the defendant until 
the defendant regains his capacity to use his Sixth Amendment 
rights.7 While examining the capacity of a defendant generally 
ensures that the defendant can use most of his or her Sixth 
Amendment rights, courts have failed to critically examine capacity 
when a defendant invokes the right to self-representation.8 
In 2008, the Supreme Court decided Indiana v. Edwards, which 
dealt with the issue of competency in a pro se trial.9 The Court 
concluded that a state may impose counsel upon a defendant that 
invokes the right of self-representation when the defendant is not 
competent to do so.10 However, the Court failed to provide lower 
courts with guidelines on the level of competency necessary for a pro 
se litigant. The Ninth Circuit adopted the holding of Edwards in 
United States v. Ferguson, remanding the case to the district court 
without clear guidance on how to conduct a competency hearing in 
this situation.11 This Note explains the competing rights between 
self-representation and competency to stand trial, and examines 
Indiana v. Edwards to see how the Supreme Court resolved these 
competing rights. Next, the Note will briefly describe the Ninth 
Circuit’s first attempt to implement Edwards, followed by an 
explanation of the need to limit the right of self-representation when 
the defendant is not competent. Finally, this Note will propose 
standards that judges should use when evaluating the competency of 
a defendant invoking the right to self-representation. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Before the Supreme Court decided Indiana v. Edwards, 
Ferguson was arrested and tried on charges of child pornography and 
 
 6. See, e.g., Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2382 (2008). 
 7. Id. 
 8. E.g., id. at 2383 (discussing the Indiana Supreme Court’s belief that Faretta was an 
absolute right); United States v. Ferguson, 560 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing 
the trial court’s decision to allow self-representation despite questions about competency). 
 9. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2381. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See Ferguson, 560 F.3d at 1070. 
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molestation.12 Ferguson objected to his court appointed counsel on 
the grounds that neither attorney would fulfill his “six duties”: 
One, request that the judge issue me the appearance bond so that I 
may enter a plea; two, not to argue the facts; three, request the 
judge close all accounts; four, request the judge waive all public 
charges by the exemption in accordance to public policy; and, five, 
request the judge present me with the order of the court; and, six, 
request the judge release me.13 
Further, the defendant continuously relied on the Uniform 
Commercial Code as a defense.14 As the trial grew closer, the 
defendant requested that he be able to represent himself because his 
lawyers failed to complete his “six duties.”15 The trial judge 
reluctantly agreed, believing the right to self-representation was an 
absolute right.16 
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Any court proceeding must both be fair and “appear fair.”17 
Thus, the protections in the Sixth Amendment are designed to 
ensure not only a fair trial, but also the appearance of a fair trial. 
Further, ensuring that a defendant is competent to stand trial serves 
the purpose of having a fair trial.18 Conversely, allowing an 
incompetent defendant to represent himself may frustrate the fairness 
of the proceedings. To develop this argument fully, this section first  





 12. Id. at 1062. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 1062, 1064. 
 15. Id. at 1063. 
 16. Id. at 1063–64. Not only did the judge find reason to pause with the defendant’s 
request, but the attorneys for the government also expressed concern. Id. 
 17. Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2387 (2008) (quoting Wheat v. United 
States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988)). 
 18. E.g., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (“Some have viewed the 
common-law prohibition ‘as a by-product of the ban against trials in absentia; the mentally 
incompetent defendant, though physically present in the courtroom, is in reality afforded no 
opportunity to defend himself.’”) (citations omitted); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 
(1966) (“The court’s failure to make such inquiry thus deprived Robinson of his constitutional 
right to a fair trial.”). 
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summarizes the right to self-representation. Lastly, this section sets  
forth Indiana v. Edwards, which attempts to harmonize 
competency, the right to self-representation, and the state’s interest 
of ensuring a fair trial. 
A. Competency to Stand Trial 
The Constitution does not allow the state to try individuals that 
are incapable of understanding the proceedings against them and are 
incapable of assisting their attorneys in the preparation of a defense.19 
Thus, judges must ensure that defendants can assist in their defense, 
or in other words, exercise their Sixth Amendment rights. This 
section explores the Supreme Court’s standards on competency. 
The Court first announced the modern standard of competency 
to stand trial in Dusky v. United States.20 Dusky dealt with a man 
standing trial for kidnapping despite mental health professionals 
concluding that the defendant was not competent to understand the 
proceedings against him.21 Reversing the decision to try Dusky, the 
Supreme Court announced a two-part test on competency: (1) the 
defendant must be able “to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding,” and (2) the defendant must 
rationally and factually understand the court proceedings.22 While 
the Court announced a competency standard, the short, per curiam 
opinion failed to explain to lower courts how to apply the standard 
in practice. 
However, the Court did clarify the competency standard by 
providing factors and instructing judges on some basic elements of 
procedure in Pate v. Robinson.23 Illinois tried and convicted 
Robinson for the murder of his common-law wife.24 During the 
 
 19. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam) (“[T]he ‘test must be 
whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him.’”). The Court ventured into the realm of competency for the first 
time in Dusky. See Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2383. 
 20. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402. 
 21. Dusky v. United States, 271 F.2d 385, 388 (8th Cir. 1959) (“It is the opinion of 
the staff, following interview of the patient, that he had improved in recent weeks but his 
condition is still such that he is unable to understand the nature of the proceedings with 
reference to the charges against him and is unable to properly assist counsel in his defense.”). 
 22. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402. 
 23. 383 U.S. 375 (1966). 
 24. Id. at 376. 
DO NOT DELETE 3/12/2010 3:06 PM 
321 A Fool for a Client: Competency Standards in Pro Se Cases 
 325 
proceedings, Robinson’s counsel continuously stated that Robinson 
was not presently competent, but the trial court chose not to 
conduct a competency hearing.25 On a habeas corpus petition, 
Robinson successfully argued that the lack of a competency hearing 
violated his due process rights.26 In order to protect a defendant’s 
due process rights, the Court reasoned the trial court should initiate 
a competency hearing sua sponte when there is an indication that the 
defendant may not be competent.27 The Court provided three 
factors to assist judges in making a determination of the competency 
of a defendant: (1) evidence of irrational behavior, (2) the 
defendant’s demeanor at trial, and (3) expert testimony.28 Because 
the trial court failed to accord proper weight to the expert testimony 
offered, as well as evidence of Robinson’s irrational behavior, the 
Supreme Court granted Robinson a writ of habeas corpus.29 
The Court expounded upon the competency standards from 
Dusky and Pate in Drope v. Missouri.30 Drope involved a man charged 
with raping his wife.31 During the trial, the defendant attempted to 
commit suicide by shooting himself in the stomach.32 Despite 
opinions offered by psychiatrists stating that any person attempting 
to commit suicide was not competent, the judge proceeded to trial 
and Drope was convicted. The Supreme Court reversed because of 
the evidence suggesting Drope was not competent to stand trial.33 
The Court concluded that a person absent from a trial due to a 
suicide attempt might not be competent to stand trial for two 





stability.35 Second, the inability of the court to observe the defendant 
 
 25. Id. at 384–85. 
 26. Id. at 386. 
 27. Id. at 385. 
 28. Id. at 385–86. 
 29. Id. at 386. 
 30. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975). 
 31. Id. at 164. 
 32. Id. at 166–67. 
 33. Id. at 179. 
 34. Id. at 181. 
 35. Id. 
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at trial renders the court incapable of making a competency 
determination.36 Thus, when the defendant offers evidence 
suggesting incompetency and the court cannot proceed through the 
usual analysis, the court should stay the proceedings until a 
competency determination occurs, even if that leads to an aborted 
trial.37 
The Court reasoned that trying an incompetent person is similar 
to trying a person in absentia, because in both situations the state 
denies defendants their rights.38 Though present for the proceedings, 
the mentally incompetent defendant “is in reality afforded no 
opportunity to defend himself.”39 Thus, the Supreme Court 
reasoned that a failure to conduct a competency hearing when the 
defendant’s behavior suggests that a competency hearing may be 
appropriate violates a person’s right to a fair trial.40 
B. Right to Self-Representation 
While competency evaluations provide one level of protection to 
a fair trial, the Sixth Amendment affords other levels of protection to 
defendants.41 Through the years, the Supreme Court has interpreted 
the Sixth Amendment to afford protections to defendants at trial. 
The Court afforded indigent defendants counsel at the expense of 
the government in all criminal trials.42 Indeed, denying a defendant 
the opportunity to consult an attorney infringes upon the rights of 
the defendant.43 Further, the Court held defendants have the right to 
confront witnesses, including the opportunity to cross-examine 
them.44 
 
 Ultimately, the rights embodied in the Sixth Amendment give 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 181–82. 
 38. Id. at 171. 
 39. Id. (quoting Caleb Foote, Comment, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of 
Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 832, 834 (1960)). 
 40. E.g., Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Dusky v. United States 362 U.S. 402 
(1960). 
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 42. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 43. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 50 (1932) (finding that a right to counsel includes 
the right to consult with counsel in preparation for trial). 
 44. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
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defendants the right to personally oversee their defense at trial.45 The 
Court held in Faretta v. California that implied in the right to 
counsel is the right to forgo the counsel’s assistance and engage in 
self-representation.46 California prosecuted Faretta for grand theft.47 
The court attempted to appoint a public defender, to which Faretta 
refused believing he would have a better chance representing 
himself.48 While the judge expressed his disagreement with Faretta, 
he initially allowed Faretta to represent himself, though he warned 
Faretta that he “would receive no special favors.”49 At a subsequent 
hearing, the judge determined Faretta was unable to represent 
himself and appointed counsel.50 At trial, Faretta was convicted.51 
The appellate courts in California affirmed the conviction of Faretta 
because the state and federal constitutions did not guarantee a right 
of self-representation.52 
Reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held defendants 
have a right to represent themselves at trial by “knowingly and 
intelligently” waiving the right to counsel.53 The Court found 
historical evidence showing the existence of the right of self-
representation in the beginnings of the common law and colonial 
charters.54 Further, the text of the Sixth Amendment implies the 
right to control the defense presented at trial, which includes the 
right to self-representation.55 
Because the right to self-representation conflicts with the right to 
counsel, only defendants that “knowingly and intelligently” waive 
the right to counsel can represent themselves pro se.56 Thus, the 
Court imposed upon judges a requirement that they must explain to 
 
 45. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975). 
 46. Id. at 814–15 (“[T]he Constitution does not force a lawyer upon a defendant.” 
(quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942))). 
 47. Id. at 807. 
 48. Id. (“[H]e did not want to be represented by the public defender because he 
believed that that office was ‘very loaded down with . . . a heavy case load.’”). 
 49. Id. at 807–08. 
 50. Id. at 809–10. 
 51. Id. at 811. 
 52. Id. at 811–12. 
 53. Id. at 835. 
 54. Id. at 823–32. 
 55. Id. at 819–20. 
 56. Id. at 835. 
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defendants the implications of giving up the right to counsel.57 
However, the Court failed to detail the limits of the right.58 
C. Indiana v. Edwards—Competency and Self-Representation 
Because the Supreme Court enunciated a right without clearly 
expressing any limits, courts believed that the right to self-
representation was absolute, regardless of other limitations.59 Thus, 
courts reluctantly allowed competent defendants under the Dusky 
standard to represent themselves, even though they may not 
adequately defend themselves, because judges believed self-
representation “trumped” other interests.60 However, in Indiana v. 
Edwards, the trial judge refused to allow a defendant to represent 
himself when the judge believed the defendant to be mentally 
incompetent.61 
In Edwards, Edwards attempted to steal a pair of shoes from a 
department store.62 Security guards confronted Edwards who drew a 
gun and fired it, wounding a bystander.63 Edwards was indicted for 
attempted murder and battery.64 Edwards’s appointed counsel 
requested a psychiatric evaluation that eventually led to the judge 
declaring Edwards incompetent.65 After being committed to a state 
hospital, doctors testified that Edwards was competent for trial.66 
Yet, Edwards’s condition worsened, leading the court to declare him 
 
 57. Id. (“[The defendant] should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of 
self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his 
choice is made with eyes open.’”(quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 
269, 279 (1942))). 
 58. The Court acknowledged in a footnote that a defendant that represents himself for 
the sole purpose of disrupting the trial can forfeit the right to self-representation. Id. at 834 
n.46. 
 59. E.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975) (“To thrust counsel upon the 
accused, against his considered wish, thus violates the logic of the Amendment.”). The 
Supreme Court indicated in dicta that a person may lack the capacity to go to trial without the 
assistance of counsel. Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954) (“If [the defendant] is 
insane, his need of a lawyer to tender the defense is too plain for argument.”). 
 60. United States v. Ferguson, 560 F.3d 1060, 1064 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 61. Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2382–83, 2388 (2008). 
 62. Id. at 2382. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.  
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incompetent again.67 This cycle happened one more time before 
Edwards was finally declared competent to stand trial.68 
Before trial, Edwards demanded to represent himself, but the 
court denied the request because of Edwards’s history of mental 
illness.69 After the state decided to retry Edwards for attempted 
murder, he again asked to represent himself at trial.70 At the second 
trial, a jury convicted Edwards of attempted murder and battery.71 
On appeal, both the Indiana Court of Appeals and Indiana Supreme 
Court held Edwards had an absolute right to represent himself.72 
In affirming the trial court’s decision, the United States Supreme 
Court found that competency limited the exercise of the right of 
self-representation.73 Courts and states must ensure trials are not 
only fair, but also appear fair.74 Thus, when a court allows a mentally 
incompetent defendant to represent himself at trial, questions arise as 
to the fairness of the trial.75 Further, the Court reasoned that while a 
person may be competent to assist counsel, he might be unable to 
perform the greater and more difficult task of conducting a trial.76 In 
dealing with Faretta, the Court pointed out several cases relied upon 
in Faretta that support the notion that the right to self-
representation assumes the absence of special or unusual 
circumstances, including incompetency.77 Thus, embedded in the 
Faretta doctrine was a limitation based on mental derangement. 
Lastly, the Court also concluded that allowing a mentally 
incompetent defendant to stand trial destroys the dignity of the 
defendant.78 While the Court allowed states to deny the right of self-
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 2383. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 2387–88. 
 74. Id. at 2387 (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988)). 
 75. Id. (citing Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954) (“No trial can be fair that 
leaves the defense to a man who is insane, unaided by counsel, and who by reason of his 
mental condition stands helpless and alone before the court.”)). 
 76. Id. at 2386 (“[A]n individual may well be able to satisfy Dusky’s mental competence 
standard, for he will be able to work with counsel at trial, yet at the same time he may be 
unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of 
counsel.”). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. at 2387. 
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representation, the majority failed to provide specific direction on 
how to conduct a competency analysis, opting instead for trial judges 
to make the decision.79 
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION 
The Ninth Circuit remanded Ferguson because Edwards changed 
the law that the trial court relied upon.80 The court explained that 
before Edwards, defendants meeting the Dusky standard had the 
right to represent themselves.81 After Edwards, however, defendants 
meeting the Dusky standard also must meet another higher standard 
before being allowed to represent themselves.82 Yet the circuit court 
followed the Supreme Court in Edwards by not specifically 
enunciating the higher standard trial judges are to rely on.83 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. Limiting Self-Representation 
When a defendant opts to represent himself, the judge must take 
a more active role in the trial. First, the judge must explain to the 
defendant the dangers and pitfalls of self-representation.84 Second, 
the judge must ensure the trial appears, and in reality is, fair.85 Thus, 
judges presiding over pro se trials often will assist the defendant by 
calling and examining witnesses, even over the objection of the pro 
se defendant.86 Therefore, judges presiding over pro se cases take an 
active role to guarantee that the prosecution will not abuse the 
system and to assist the defendant, while attempting not to infringe 




 79. Id. 
 80. United States v. Ferguson, 560 F.3d 1060, 1064 (2009). 
 81. Id. at 1066–67. 
 82. Id. at 1068. 
 83. Id. 
 84. United States v. Mendez-Sanchez, 563 F.3d 935, 945 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e 
recognize this constitutional right only where demanded after advice on the hazards of self-
representation.”). 
 85. Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2387 (2008). 
 86. See Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (Burger, J., 
concurring in part). 
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1. Difficulties in self-representation 
 
Mentally ill defendants experience greater difficulties in self-
representation compared to otherwise competent defendants. 
Indeed, the American Psychiatric Association, in an amicus brief, 
stated that the “symptoms of severe mental illnesses can impair the 
defendant’s ability to play the significantly expanded role required 
for self-representation even if he can play the lesser role of 
represented defendant.”87 Thus, when an incompetent defendant 
invokes the right of self-representation, the burden to ensure a fair 
trial increases. First, the incompetent defendant may have difficulties 
in communicating with the judge and jury.88 Second, the defendant 
may have trouble managing his case, making motions, examining 
witnesses, and addressing the judge and the jury.89 These difficulties 
may lead the trial to be a “spectacle that could well . . . [be as] 
humiliating as ennobling.”90 This, in turn, will require the judge to 
assist the defendant more to ensure a fair trial. Thus, the added 
difficulties of a pro se trial are heightened by allowing a mentally 
incompetent defendant to run his own defense. 
2. Benefits of a competency evaluation 
By allowing judges to conduct competency hearings when a 
questionably competent defendant invokes the right of self-
representation, trials will more likely be fair. The protections in the 
Constitution would be meaningless if courts were prevented “from 
acting to preserve the very processes that the Constitution itself 
prescribes.”91 Indeed, it is paradoxical to force courts to allow 
incompetent defendants to represent themselves when the basic 
purpose of constitutional criminal law is to provide a fair trial.92 
Under a competency evaluation, judges can protect the rights of  
 
 87. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2387 (quoting Brief for American Psychiatric Association et 
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 26, Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 
(2008) (No. 07-208), 2008 WL 405546). 
 88. E.g., Ferguson, 560 F.3d at 1063 (describing communications between the 
defendant and the judge as “confusing”). 
 89. See Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2386 (citing studies explaining the impact of mental 
disease on basic attorney functions). 
 90. Id. at 2387. 
 91. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 92. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2387. 
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competent defendants to self-representation, while ensuring all 
defendants will enjoy the full force of the underlying right to a fair 
trial. 
B. Standards to Evaluate Competency in Pro Se Trials 
While the Supreme Court headed in the right direction by 
limiting the right to self-representation when the defendant is 
incompetent,93 it failed to provide adequate guidance to assist courts 
in making the necessary determination of competency—the Court 
insisted on a new standard but failed to articulate the standard to 
follow.94 The Ninth Circuit had the chance in Ferguson to provide 
clarity to district courts but failed to do so.95 This section develops a 
proposed standard to assist judges in making a competency 
evaluation. 
The Dusky standard for mental competency is “whether [the 
defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether the 
defendant has a rational and factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him.”96 This standard fails to assist judges in 
making a self-representation competency decision for two reasons. 
First, a person invoking the right of self-representation does not have 
a lawyer to consult. The first prong of the test, therefore, does not 
provide a basis for analyzing a defendant’s competency in this 
respect. Second, with respect to the second prong, a pro se 
defendant has the burden of understanding the substantive law 
against him, not just a rational and factual understanding of the 
proceedings. 
Working from the Dusky competency to stand trial standard, a 
new standard must take into account the defendant’s active role in 
the trial. First, a competent person under this new standard must 
have the ability to communicate with the court, witnesses, and jury. 
Second, a competent person must not only factually understand the 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. See United States v. Ferguson, 560 F.3d 1060, 1067–68 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that “[t]he standard for a defendant’s mental competence to stand trial is now different from 
the standard for a defendant’s mental competence to represent himself or herself at trial” but 
then remanding to the district court without articulating the standard to be applied). 
 95. Id. at 1067. 
 96. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). 
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proceedings against him, but he must possess a de minimis 
understanding of both the substantive and procedural law being 
applied against him. This standard serves to protect a defendant by 
ensuring the defendant will be able to adequately take advantage of 
his Sixth Amendment rights by communicating with witnesses,97 
understanding the proceedings against him,98 and knowingly waiving 
the right to counsel. In applying this new standard, judges will still 
be able to use the Pate factors to make a decision: (1) irrational 
behavior, (2) demeanor in court, and (3) prior medical history. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Sixth Amendment affords protections to criminal defendants 
on trial.99 Among the rights specified in the text of the Constitution 
is an implied right of self-representation.100 Courts routinely have 
allowed defendants to “knowingly and intelligently” waive the right 
to counsel despite the competency of the defendant because the 
right to self-representation was viewed as absolute.101 Allowing all 
defendants to represent themselves posed problems, however, 
especially when a defendant suffered from a mental illness that made 
managing a trial difficult.102 
To address these problems, the Supreme Court in Edwards 
established a competency limitation on the right of self-
representation.103 Unfortunately, both the Supreme Court in 
Edwards and the Ninth Circuit in Ferguson failed to give guidance to 
lower courts on the appropriate standard to determine such 
competency of a pro se defendant. 
To provide a fair trial by preserving the rights of the defendant, 
the judge should determine the competency of the defendant to 
 
 97. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“[T]he accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him [and] to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor.”); see also United States v. Cooper, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 431 (C.C. Pa. 1800) (Chase, Circuit 
Justice). See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (discussing the right to 
confrontation). 
 98. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402. 
 99. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818–19 (1975). 
 100. Id. 
 101. E.g., United States v. Ferguson, 560 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 102. Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2387 (2008) (quoting a psychiatrist’s reaction 
to seeing a mentally incompetent patient defend himself: “[H]ow in the world can our legal 
system allow an insane man to defend himself?’” (citations omitted)). 
 103. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2387–88.  
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represent himself: first, by deciding whether the defendant will be 
able to communicate with the judge, the jury, and witnesses; and 
second, by determining whether the defendant has a de minimis 
substantive and procedural legal understanding of the proceedings as 
well as a factual and rational understanding. This standard will 
protect the dignity of the defendant as well as the criminal process 
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